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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court had original appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
UCA§78A-3-102. The Court of Appeals now has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to 
UCA§78A-4-103(2)G). 
V 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
Mr. Pett asserts the following issues on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that Marx was properly and 
legally appointed as a justice court judge in Box Elder County without complying with 
provisions of UCA §78A-2-202? (Record 1-3, 158-177). 
Standard of Review: Whether or not Marx was properly appointed as a justice 
court judge is a mixed question of fact and law that the Court reviews for correctness, 
affording only a limited degree of deference to the district court's findings. Hutter v. Dig-Tt. 
Inc. 219 P.3d 918 (Utah 2009). 
2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that Marx was properly and 
legally appointed as a justice court judge in Box Elder County without being certified by the 
Utah Supreme Court as qualified to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County as 
mandated by provisions of UCA §78A-2-202? (Record 1-3, 158-177). 
Standard of Review: Whether or not Marx was legally appointed a justice court 
judge without being certified by the Supreme Court is a question of law, which is reviewed 
V I 
for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Parduhn v. 
Bennett. 220 P.3d 1203 (Utah 2009). 
3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that Marx was properly and 
legally appointed as a justice court judge in Box Elder County without being certified as 
qualified to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County by the Box Elder County 
Attorney, as mandated by provisions of UCA §78A-2-202? (Record 1-3,158-177). 
Standard of Review: Whether or not Marx was legally appointed a justice court 
judge without being certified by the Supreme Court is a question of law, which is reviewed 
for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Parduhn v. 
Bennett. 220 P.3d 1203 (Utah 2009). 
4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in concluding that Marx was properly and 
legally appointed as a justice court judge in Box Elder County when he was appointed as a 
temporary justice court judge without specifying any time period of his appointment. 
(Record 1-3, 158-177). 
Standard of Review: Whether or not Marx was legally appointed a justice court 
judge without being certified by the Supreme Court is a question of law, which is reviewed 
for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Parduhn v. 
Bennett. 220 P.3d 1203 (Utah 2009). 
5. Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it concluded that Box Elder County 
did, and could, retroactively validate Christensen's appointment of Marx as a justice court 
vii 
judge in Box Elder County? (Record 1-3, 158-177). 
Standard of Review: Whether or not Box Elder County did, and could, retroactively 
validate Christensen's appointment of Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder County is 
a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's 
legal conclusions. Parduhn v. Bennett. 220 P.3d 1203 (Utah 2009). 
6. Did the trial court err as a matter of law when it ruled that any rulings made, 
orders entered, judgments entered, fines assessed, penalties assessed y,u\ iii'K' imposed, or 
any other purported legal actions engaged in by Marx, while piupoitinii to ,u l as ,i pistice 
court judge in Box Elder County, prioi to the date of his alleged \ippomtmonl ^ ,i justice 
court judge in Box hder Comity on December 8, 2008, are valid7 (Record 1-3, 158-177). 
Standard ol Review: Whether or not any rulings made, orders entered, judgments 
entered, fines assessed, penalties assessed, jail time imposed, or any other purported legal 
actions engaged in by Marx, while purporting to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder 
County, prior to the date of his alleged "appointment" as a justice court judge in Box Eder 
County on December 8, 2008, are valid is a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness giving no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Parduhn v. Bennett. 
220 P.3d 1203 (Utah 2009). 
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VII 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the trial court's June 15, 2009, Memorandum Decision, and 
the trial court's June 29, 2009, Order on Memorandum Decision, denying Mr. Pett's 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief, effectively holdmg that David Marx could act as a justice 
court judge in Box Elder County, without being appointed as a justice court judge in Box 
Elder County, as mandated by the provisions of UCA §78A-7-202, th.it his i uhngs made 
prior to his alleged "appointment" as a justice coutl |u»l v m Bov I Idei ('oun!\ on 
December 8, 2008, are valid, contrary to the provisions of UCA §78A-7-104(l); that Marx 
could act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County without being certified as being 
qualified to act as justice court judge in Box Elder County, as required by UCA §78A-7-
202(3 )(c); that Marx could act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County without being 
certified as being qualified to act as justice court judge in Box Elder County by the Utah 
Supreme Court, as required by UCA §78A-7-202(3)(c), and that the alleged appointment of 
Marx as a justice court judge on December 8, 2008, retroactively validated his prior 
appointment by Judge Christensen as a justice court judge in Box Elder County and 
retroactively validated all of his prior rulings, orders, judgments, sentences and fines. 
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B 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Mr. Pett filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief under the provisions Rule 
65B(d)(2)(a) URCP, on December 1, 2008, in the form specified in Rule 19 URAP, asking 
the trial court to rule that David Marx had never been lawfully appointed as a justice court 
judge in Box Elder County, and, therefore, had no authority to act as a justice court judge, 
and that all of Marx's mlings in Mr. Pett's case, as well as all other cases in which he acted 
as a justice court judge in Box Elder County are void. Mr. Pett's Petition was served on 
Box Elder County, Brigham City and Marx. 
On December 18, 2008, Brigham City filed a response to Mr. Pett's Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief. Box Elder County also filed a response to Mr. Pett's Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief. However, Marx never filed a response to Mr. Pett's Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief. 
On March 10, 2009, after Judge Allen indicated that Mr. Pett's Petition was governed 
by the provisions of Rule 65B(d) URCP, rather than Rule 19 URAP, Mr. Pett filed a 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the form specified in Rule 65B(d)(2)(a) URCP, and filed 
a separate memorandum in support of the Petition as required by Rule 65B(d)(2)(a) URCP. 
This Petition was served on Box Elder County, Brigham City and Marx. In conjunction 
with his Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Mr. Pett filed a Memorandum in Support of his 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief. Mr. Pett's Memorandum in Support of his Petition was 
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also served on Box Elder County, Brigham City and Marx. 
None of the respondents in this case filed any response to Mr. Pett's Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief filed in the form mandated by Rule 65B(d)(2)(a) URCP. 
On June 15, 2009, the district court entered a memorandum decision stating that 
because the Box Elder County Commission allegedly appointed Marx as a "justice court 
judge" on December 8, 2008, it was dismissing Mi Pelt s Petition loi Extraordinary Relief. 
On June 29, 2009, the distiid until i iiteied tin onler ihsinis^inii Mi Pett's Petition 
for Extraordinary Relief 
Mr. Pett filed his Notice of Appeal on July 28, 2009. 
On January 12, 2010, Mr. Pett filed a transcript of the December 8, 2008, Box Elder 
County Commission Meeting of December 8, 2008, with the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 17, 2008, Mr. Pett was given a citation requiring him to appear in the 
Box Elder County Justice Court. (Record at 66). 
2. Mr Pett appeared on July 26, 200X and pleat 1 noi mullv to the charges in the 
citation. (Record at 72). 
3. \\ the Inly 26, 2008, healing, Mi IVtt t ^pie ted i l\ una! minimal inn In1 n\en 
him, so lie could have a copy of the charges and flu- casr nmnlvi of the case Record at 3). 
4. Mr. Pett received a copy of the information in Case No. 081002646 MO 
sometime after the July 26, 2008, hearing. (Record at 3). 
5. Upon receiving a copy of the information and the case number, Mr. Pett filed a 
Motion, pursuant to the provisions of Rule29A URCirP, to disqualify Kevin Christensen as 
acting as the "justice court judge" in the case. (Record at 3-4). 
6. Christensen never officially recused himself from the case, or if he did Mr. Pett 
was never provided with a copy of Christensen's recusal. (Record at 4). 
7. Although Christensen never officially recused himself or complied with the 
mandates of Rule 29 A of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and transmitted Mr. Pett's 
Motion to Disqualify him to another judge for review, at the next hearing David Marx 
appeared, claiming to be a Box Elder County justice court judge. (Record at 4). 
8. Beginning in January 2008, Judge Christensen would routinely and regularly 
appoint other justice court judges to act as justice court judges in Box Elder County. 
(Transcript of December 8, 2008, Box Elder County Commission Meeting, page 6, lines 22-
25, page 6, lines 6-10, page 8, 2-4, page 11, lines 6-7, page 12, lines 7-14). 
9. Based on Christensen's appointment, Marx has been acting as a Box Elder 
County justice court judge court in case No. 081002646 MO, ever since Mr. Pett filed his 
Motion to Disqualify Christensen. (Record at 4). 
10. According the Utah Court's web site, at the time Mr. Pett filed his Petition, Marx 
was a "justice court judge" in Hyde Park and North Logan, in Cache County. He was not a 
"justice court judge" in Box Elder County. (Record at 172). 
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11. At the time Mr. Pert filed his Petition, Marx was never properly appointed to act 
as an interim "justice court judge," a special "justice court judge," a replacement "justice 
court judge," or any other type of "justice court judge" in the Box Elder County Justice 
Court. (Record at 80, 176). 
12. Marx has never been certified by the Judicial Council to act as a "justice court 
judge" in the Box Elder Justice Court. (Record at 80,176). 
13. On December 8, 2008, the Box Elder County Commission attempted to appoint 
Marx as a "temporary justice court judge" for Box Elder County, thus confirming Mr. Pett's 
assertions that Marx has been acting as a justice court judge in Box Elder County without 
any such authority to do so. (Transcript of December 8, 2008, Box Elder County 
Commission Meeting, page 2, lines 6-13). 
14. At the December 8, 2008, County Commission Meeting, the Box Elder County 
Commission attempted to appoint Marx as a "temporary justice court judge" for Box Elder 
County, without any specific or definite term, and without appointing him to act as a justice 
court judge in Box Elder County for any specific case or cases. (Transcript of 
December 8, 2008, Box Elder County Commission Meeting, page s 4-5, lines 12-3, page 9, 
lines 18-23, page 12-13, lines 15-18). 
15. In spite of the Box Elder County Commission attempting to appoint Marx as a 
"temporary justice court judge" for Box Elder County, the Box Elder County Commission 
never reported Marx's alleged appointment to the Judicial Council, as mandated by §78A-7-
-5-
202-3(b), which was in efTect at of the time of Max's alleged appointment. (Record at 80, 
176). 
16. The Box Elder County Attorney has never provided the Judicial Council with a 
written opinion that Marx meets the statutory qualifications for the office of a "justice court 
judge" in Box Elder County, as required by §78A-7-202-3(b), which was in effect at of the 
time of Marx's alleged appointment. (Record at 80, 176). 
17. The Judicial Council has never certified Marx as being qualified to act as a 
"justice court judge" in Box Elder County, as mandated by §78A-7-202-3(b), which was in 
effect at of the time of Marx's alleged appointment. (Record at 80, 176). 
18. On December 1, 2008, Mr. Pett filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief under 
the provisions of Rule 65B(d)(2)(a) URCP, in the form specified in Rule 19 URAP. (Record 
at 1-13). 
19. On December 18, 2008, Brigham City filed a response to Mr. Pett's Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief, filed in the from specified in Rule 19 URAP. (Record at 55-63). 
20. On December 23, 2008, Box Elder County filed a response to Mr. Pett's Petition 
for Extraordinary Relief filed in the from specified in Rule 19 URAP. (Record at 105-108). 
21. Marx never filed a response to Mr. Pett's Petition for Extraordinary Relief 
filed in the from specified in Rule 19 URAP. (Record at 1-13). 
22. On March 10, 2009, after Judge Allen indicated that Mr. Pett's Petition was 
governed by the provisions of Rule 65B(d) URCP, rather than Rule 19 URAP, Mr. Pett 
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filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the form specified in Rule 65B(d)(2)(a) URCP. 
(Record at 156-157). 
23. In conjunction with his Petition for Extraordinary Relief, Mr. Pett filed a 
Memorandum in Support of his Petition for Extraordinary Relief. (Record at 158-177). 
24. None of the respondents in this case filed any response to Mr. Pett's Petition 
filed under the provisions of Rule 65B(d)(2)(a) URCP. (Record at 178-200). 
25. On June 15, 2009, the district court entered a memorandum decision stating that 
because the Box Elder County Commission appointed Marx as a "justice court judge" it 
was dismissing Mr. Pett's Petition for Extraordinary Relief. (Record at 180-183). 
26. On July 29, 2009, the district court entered an order dismissing Mr. Pett's 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief. (Record at 185-186). 
27. Mr. Pett filed his Notice of Appeal on July 28, 2009. (Record at 188-190). 
28. On January 12, 2010, Mr. Pett filed a transcript of the December 8, 2009, Box 
Elder County Commission Meeting of December 8, 2008, with the trial court. (Record at 
199-200). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that Marx was lawfully 
appointed as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, on December 8, 2008. The trial 
court also erred as a matter of law when it concluded that any rulings Marx made, any 
orders he entered, any judgments he entered, any fines he assessed, any penalties he 
_7_ 
imposed, any jail time he imposed, or any other purported legal actions he engaged in, while 
purporting to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, prior to the date of his 
alleged appointment as a justice court judge in Box Elder County on December 8, 2008, are 
valid. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT DENIED 
MR. PETT'S PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF AND, RULED THAT 
MARX WAS PROPERLY AND LAWFULLY APPOINTED AS A JUSTICE 
COURT JUDGE IN BOX ELDER COUNTY WHEN, THE BOX ELDER COUNTY 
COMMISSION FAILED TO APPOINT MARX IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
PROVISIONS OF UCA §78A-2-202. THE TRIAL COURT ALSO ERRED AS A 
MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT THE THAT BOX ELDER COUNTY 
COMMISSION COULD RETROACTIVELY VALIDATE CHRISTENSEN'S 
APPOINTMENT OF MARX AS A JUSTICE COURT JUDGE IN BOX ELDER. 
THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT 
RULED THAT ANY RULINGS MADE, ORDERS ENTERED, JUDGMENTS 
ENTERED, FINES ASSESSED, PENALTIES ASSESSED, JAIL TIME IMPOSED, 
OR ANY OTHER PURPORTED LEGAL ACTIONS ENGAGED IN BY MARX, 
PRIOR TO THE DATE OF HIS ALLEGED APPOINTMENT AS A JUSTICE 
COURT JUDGE IN BOX ELDER COUNTY ON DECEMBER 8, 2008, COULD BE 
RETROACTIVELY VALIDATED BY THE BOX ELDER COUNTY 
COMMISSION 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT 
MARX WAS PROPERLY AND LAWFULLY APPOINTED AS A JUSTICE 
COURT JUDGE IN BOX ELDER COUNTY, WHEN THE BOX ELDER COUNTY 
COMMISSION FAILED TO APPOINT HIM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
PROVISIONS OF UCA §78A-2-202 
A. Marshaling Of Facts. 
The only factual finding that the trial court made that would support its dismissal of 
Mr. Pett's Petition for Extraordinary Relief is that the Box Elder County Commission 
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appointed Marx as a Justice Court Judge in Box Elder County on December 8, 2008. 
B. The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Ruling That Marx Was Properly 
And Lawfully Appointed As A Justice Court Judge In Box Elder County. When The 
Box Elder County Commission Failed To Appoint Him In Accordance With The 
Provisions of UCA §78A-7-202(3VaNL Requiring The Commission To Report The 
Confirmed Judge's Name To The Judicial Council 
The version of UCA §78A-7-202 in affect at the time of Marx's alleged appointment 
as a justice court judge, i.e., December 8, 2008, specified: 
Vacancy. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Appointing authority" means: 
(i) for a county: 
(A) the chair of the county commission in a county operating under the county 
commission or expanded county commission form of county government; 
(B) the county executive in a county operating under the county executive-council 
form of county government; and 
(C) the county manager in a county operating under the council-manager form of 
county government; and 
(ii) for a city or town, the mayor of the city or town. 
(b) "Local legislative body" means: 
(i) for a county, the county commission or county council; and 
(ii) for a city or town, the council of the city or town. 
(2) Justice court judges shall be appointed by the appointing authority and 
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confirmed by a majority vote of the local legislative body. 
(3) (a) After a newly appointed justice court judge has been confirmed, the local 
legislative body shall report the confirmed judge's name to the Judicial Council. 
(b) The Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold office upon 
successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written opinion of 
the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutory qualifications for 
office. 
(c) A justice court judge may not perform judicial duties until certified by the 
Judicial Council. 
§78A-7-202(3)(a) specifically specified that, 'After a newly appointed justice court 
judge has been confirmed, the local legislative body shall report the confirmed judge's 
name to the Judicial Council." (Emphasis added). 
It is indisputable that the Box Elder County Commission did not report the alleged 
appointment of Marx to the Utah Supreme Court. (Record 1-200). Therefore, it is 
indisputable that the Box Elder County Commission failed to comply with the provisions of 
UCA§78A-7-202(3)(a) and report Marx's alleged appointment as justice court judge. 
Because the Box Elder County Commission failed to comply with the provisions of 
UCA §78A-7-202(3)(a) and report Marx's alleged appointment as justice court judge to the 
Judicial Council, his alleged "appointment" as a justice court judge in Box Elder County 
was not proper or legal, and nothing he has done, while acting as a Box Elder County 
justice court judge is valid. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing 
Mr. Pett's Petition for Extraordinary Relief based on its incorrect and improper conclusion 
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that Marx was properly and lawfully appointed as a justice court in Box Elder County at the 
December 8, 2008, Box Elder County Commission Meeting. 
C. The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Ruling That Marx Was Properly 
And Lawfully Appointed As A Justice Court Judge In Box Elder County. When The 
Judicial Council Had Not Certifed Him To Act As A Justice Court Judge In Box 
Elder County. As Mandated By UCA §78A-7-202(3Vb). 
The version of UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b) in effect at the time of Marx's alleged 
appointment as a Box Elder County justice court judge stated: 
The Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold office upon 
successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written opinion of 
the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutory qualifications for 
office. (Emphasis added). 
Again, it is indisputable that Marx was never certified by the Judicial Council to hold the 
office of a justice court judge in Box Elder County. (Record 1-200) 
Because Marx was never certified by the Judicial Council to hold the office of a 
justice court judge in Box Elder County, his alleged "appointment" as a justice court judge 
in Box Elder County was not proper or legal, and nothing he has done, while acting as a 
Box Elder County justice court judge is valid. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of 
law in dismissing Mr. Pett's Petition for Extraordinary Relief based on its incorrect and 
improper conclusion that Marx was properly and lawfully appointed as a justice court in 
Box Elder County at the December 8,2008, Box Elder County Commission Meeting. 
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D. The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law In Ruling That Marx Was Properly 
And Lawfully Appointed As A Justice Court Judge In Box Elder County When The 
Box Elder County Attorney Had Not Written A Letter To The Judicial Council 
Stating That In His Opinion. Marx Meets The Statutory Qualifications For The 
Office Of A Justice Court Judge In Box Elder Count. As Mandated By UCA 
§78A-7-202(3)(b). 
At the time of Marx's alleged "appointment" as a justice court judge in Box Elder 
County, i.e., December 8, 2008, UCA §78A-7-202(3)(b) specified: 
The Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold office upon 
successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written opinion of 
the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutory qualifications for 
office. (Emphasis added). 
It is yet another indisputable fact that the Box Elder County Attorney never sent the 
Judicial Council a letter stating that in his opinion, Marx meets the statutory qualifications 
for the office of a justice court judge in Box Elder Count;/, as mandated by UCA §78A-7-
202(3 )(b). Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter of law in dismissing Mr. Pett's 
Petition for Extraordinary Relief based on its incorrect and improper conclusion that Marx 
was properly and lawfully appointed as a justice court in Box Elder County at the December 
8, 2008, Box Elder County Commission Meeting. 
E. The Trial Court Erred As A Matter Of Law When It Ruled That Marx's 
Appointment As A "Temporary Justice Court Judge" Was Valid. Because The 
Box Elder County Commission's Attempt To Appoint Marx To An Indefinite 
Term As A "Temporary Justice Court Judge" In Box Elder County Was 
Unlawful. Thus Making His Alleged Appointment Invalid As A Matter Of Law. 
Utah law does not permit the indefinite appointment judges. All judges in Utah must 
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stand for a retention election at various times. Utah law mandates that all individuals 
appointed to the office of a judge stand for a retention election at the first general election 
held more than three years after his or her appointment as a judge. UCA 
§20A-12-201(l)(a) specifies: 
(I) (a) Each judicial appointee to a court is subject to an unopposed retention 
election at the first general election held more than three years after the judge or 
justice was appointed. 
When the Box Elder County Commission attempted to appoint Marx as a justice 
court judge in Box Elder County, it appointed him to an indefinite term. On page 9, lines 
18-23 of the Transcript of the December 8, 2008 Box Elder Commission hearing, 
Commissioner Davis and Steven Hadfield have the following exchange: 
Commissioner Davis: "So, Steve, as I understand it then the appointment would be 
to appoint David Marx as a temporary justice court judge, and then that 
appointment is indefinite? " 
Steven Hadfield: "That's right" 
Commissioner Davis: "That's right. " 
Previously in the hearing, the following exchange took place between Commissioner 
Davis, Steven Hadfield and Kevin Christensen: 
Commissioner Davis: What's the appointing period? Do you appoint on a calender 
year or do you appoint and then they }re appointed until they are released? 
Steven Hadfield: "It just says - - and there's really no - - it's says temporary, and 
there's really no definition of temporary. 
Kevin Christensen: / - - / think probably until they 're released because the pro tern 
-13-
process that comes down from the Supreme Court, that makes it clear that it's on a 
per case basis just for that case. And they have to be sworn in as a pro tern on each 
individual case as opposed to this. And so where they don 't say per case, then I 
think that we 're good just until it runs out or until we decide otherwise. " 
Steven Hadfield: "I would agree with that. " 
(Transcript of December 8, 2008, Box Elder County Commission hearing, pages 4-5, 
lines 12 -3). 
The Box Elder County Commission then proceeded to appoint Marx as a "temporary 
justice court judge, " with that appointment being "indefinite. " (Transcript of December 8, 
2008, Box Elder County Commission hearing, pages 9, lines 18-23). 
Temporary is not a synonym for indefinite. Black's Law Dictionary defines 
"temporary" as: "That which is to last for a limited time only, as distinguished from that 
which is perpetual or indefinite, in its durations." Thus, "temporary" is the opposite of 
"indefinite." 
Marx's alleged appointment as a "temporary justice court judge " for an "indefinite " 
period is an oxymoron. Marx could not be both appointed as a "temporary justice court 
judge " and also have that appointment be "indefinite. " 
The Box Elder County Commission could not lawfully appoint Marx as a "temporary 
justice court judge," and at the same time make his "appointment" "indefinite." Therefore, 
as a matter of law, Marx's alleged appointment as a "temporary justice court judge, " by 
the Box Elder County Commission, was invalid. Because, Marx's alleged appointment as a 
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"temporary justice court judge, " by the Box Elder County Commission, was invalid, the 
trial court erred, as a matter of law, when it concluded that Marx was lawfully appointed as 
a justice court judge in Box Elder County, by the Box Elder County Commission, when the 
Commission attempted to appoint Marx as a "temporary justice court judge, " in Box Elder 
County on December 8, 2008. Therefore, the trial court also erred as a matter of law when 
it dismissed Mr. Pett's Petition for Extraordinary Relief. 
POINT II 
TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT THE 
BOX ELDER COUNTY COMMISSION COULD RETROACTIVELY VALIDATE 
CHRISTENSEN'S APPOINTMENT OF MARX AS A JUSTICE COURT JUDGE 
IN BOX ELDER. 
In pertinent part, UCA §78A-7-104 provides: 
Justice court judges: 
(1) have the same authority regarding matters within their jurisdiction as judges of 
courts of record; 
(2) may issue search warrants and warrants of arrest upon a finding of probable 
cause; and 
(3) may conduct proceedings to determine: 
(a) probable cause for any case within their jurisdiction: and 
(b) an accused person's release on bail or his own recognizance 
(Emphasis added). 
In pertinent part, UCA §78A-7-105 provides: 
(1) The territorial jurisdiction of county justice courts extends to the limits of the 
precinct for which the justice court is created and includes all cities or towns within 
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the precinct, except cities where a municipal justice court exists. 
(2) The territorial jurisdiction of municipal justice courts extends to the corporate 
limits of the municipality in which the justice court is created. (Emphasis added). 
In pertinent part UCA §78A-7-106 specifies: 
(1) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation 
of ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial jurisdiction by a 
person 18 years of age or older. 
(2) Except those offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction, 
justice courts have jurisdiction over the following class B and C misdemeanors, 
violation of ordinances, and infractions committed within their territorial 
jurisdiction by a person 16 years of age or older 
It is undisputed that prior to Marx's alleged appointment as a justice court in Box 
Elder County on December 8, 2008, he was not a lawfully appointed justice court judge in 
Box Elder County. Therefore, prior to his alleged appointment as a justice court judge in 
Box Elder County on December 8, 2008, he had absolutely no legal authority to act as a 
justice court judge in Box Elder County. Because Marx had absolutely no legal authority to 
act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, prior to his alleged appointment on 
December 8, 2009, any mlings he made, any orders he entered, any judgments he entered, 
any fines he assessed, any penalties he assessed, any jail time he imposed, or any other 
purported legal actions he engaged in prior to his alleged appointment as a justice court 
judge in Box Elder County on December 8, 2008, are invalid, and of no force and effect 
whatsoever, as a matter of law. 
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Prior to his alleged appointment as a justice court judge in Box Elder County on 
December 8, 2008, Marx was simply another individual, when he was in Box Elder County. 
He had no more legal authority to act as a justice court judge and make any legal rulings, 
issue any orders, enter any judgments, assess any fines, impose any penalties, 
impose any jail time, or engage in any other purported legal actions than did any other 
person who happened to be in Box Elder County. 
Utah appellate courts have repeatedly held that a judge cannot assign his duties to 
someone who has not been appointed a judge. A judge cannot even assign his duties to a 
non-judicial officer of the court. In Holm v. Smilowitz 840 P.2d 157, 166 (Utah App. 
1992), citing In re Criminal Investigation. 7th Dist.Ct. No. CS-1, 754 P.2d 633, 642 (Utah 
1988), this Court declared that Judicial power is that which is "necessary to protect the 
fundamental integrity of the judicial branch," "may not be wholly delegated to a 
nonjudicial officer." 
In Holm. Commissioner Lema exceeded her authority by attempting to exercise 
ultimate judicial power reserved for a district court judge, and this Court ruled that her 
attempt to exercise ultimate judicial power reserved for a district court judge was invalid. 
This Court also mled that Judge Eves could not retroactively validate Commissioner Lema's 
unlawful actions. This Court stated: 
And such error could not be cured by ratification by Judge Eves. Judge Eves did not 
have the authority to delegate away his judicial power to an employee in the first 
place. K.C. v. State, 771 P.2d at 778; accord Mount, 228 So. 2d at 858; In re Santa 
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Cruz, 446 P. 2d at 255; C.C.C. v. District Court for the Fourth Judicial Dist, 535 
P.2d at 1119; Erves, 249 N. W.2d at 49; Lewis, 407 S. W.2d at 856; see generally 
McMillen, 460 F.2dat 359; Reed, 459 F.2dat 121. Consequently, he could not 
subsequently ratify that employee's illegal judicial acts as his own. 
The same legal principles that were involved in Holm are involved in this case, and 
even more so. Judge Cliristensen unlawfully appointed Marx as a justice court judge in Box 
Elder County. When he did so, he unlawfully delegated judicial authority to Marx, who 
was not a justice court judge in Box Elder County, or even involved with the legal system in 
Box Elder County. 
In Holm. Commissioner Lema exceeded her authority by attempting to exercise 
ultimate judicial power reserved for a district court judge. However, Commissioner Lema 
was at least a lawfully appointed commissioner, unlike Marx who had absolutely no 
position with the legal system in Box Elder County at the time he acted as a justice court 
judge in Box Elder County. 
The same legal reasoning relied on in Holm, is applicable to this case. Marx could 
not exercise any judicial functions in Box Elder County because he was not lawfully 
appointed to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, and Christensen could not 
lawfully appoint Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder County. Christensen also could 
not authorize Marx to engage in any legal actions in his place or on his behalf, or ratify any 
of Marx's unlawful actions. Therefore, under the legal principles set forth in Holm. Marx 
had absolutely no legal authority to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, and all 
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of his rulings made, orders entered, judgments entered, fines assessed, penalties assessed, 
jail time imposed, or any other purported legal actions engaged in by Marx, while 
purporting to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, prior to the date of his 
alleged "appointment" as a justice court judge in Box Elder County on December 8, 2008, 
are invalid and void as a matter of law. 
The case of Kasteler v. Gibbons 080207 UTCA, 20070345, is also relevant to this 
Appeal. Mr. Pett is aware that Kasteler is an unpublished decision of this Court, and that it 
is generally not appropriate to cite to unpublished decisions. See, Schultz v. State. 132 P.3d 
701 (Utah App. 2006). However, because Kasteler is a decision of this Court, and it 
involves a situation very similar to the facts of this case, Mr. Pett respectfully seeks the 
Court's indulgence with respect to his reference to Kasteler. 
Kasteler is directly relevant to this case because in Kasteler. Justice Court Judge 
Catherine M. Johnson recused herself after Kasteler filed a motion to disqualify. Judge 
Johnson then transferred Kasteler's cases to the Holladay Justice Court and purported to 
appoint Judge Daniel Gibbons to act as a justice court judge in South Salt Lake City. That 
scenario is very similar to the facts of this case. 
In Kasteler. Judge Johnson recused herself and then appointed Judge Gibbons to act 
as justice court judge in South Salt Lake, where he had not been appointed to act as a 
justice court judge. In this case Christensen apparently recused himself and then appointed 
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Marx to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, where Marx had not been 
appointed as a justice court judge. 
When Kasteler filed an emergency petition for extraordinary relief, Judge Lindberg 
vacated the appointment of Judge Gibbons because Johnson had no authority to appoint 
Gibbons as a justice court judge in South Salt Lake, and directed the South Salt Lake Mayor 
to appoint a substitute judge to hear Kasteler's cases. Judge Lindberg specifically cited to 
UCA 78-5-138, in vacating the appointment of Gibbons, and when instmcting the Salt Lake 
Mayor to appoint a substitute judge to hear Kasteler's cases. 
The main difference between this case and Kasteler appears to be that in Kasteler, 
Judge Gibbons did little if anything in Kasteler's cases, whereas, Marx acted as a justice 
court judge in Box Elder County for nearly a year and made mlings, entered orders, entered 
judgments, assessed fines, assessed penalties, imposed jail time, and engaged in other legal 
activities while acting as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, prior to the date of his 
alleged "appointment" as a justice court judge in Box Elder County on December 8, 2008. 
However, the legal analsys of Judge Lindberg in vacating Judge Gibbons' unlawful 
appointment as a justice court judge, made by Judge Johnson, and this Court's affirmation 
of Judge Lindberg's legal analysis vacating Judge Gibbons' unlawful appointment as a 
justice court judge, made by Judge Johnson, is directly relevant and controlling in this 
matter. 
Just as this Court affirmed, Judge Johnson was not empowered to appoint Judge 
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Gibbons as a justice court judge in South Salt Lake City, Christensen was not empowered 
to appoint Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder County. Just as the Mayor of South 
Salt Lake City was required to comply with the provisions of UCA 78-5-138, when 
appointing a temporary justice court judge to hear Kasteler's cases, the Box Elder County 
Commission was required to comply with the provisions of UCA §78A-7-202, et. seq., in 
order to appoint Marx, or anyone else, a justice court judge in Box Elder County. 
Because Marx was never lawfully appointed as a justice court judge in Box Elder 
County, prior to December 8, 2008, assuming, arguendo, that he was lawfully appointed at 
that time, he had absolutely no legal authority to make any rulings, enter any orders, enter 
any judgments, assess any fines, assess any penalties, impose any jail time, and/or engage in 
any other legal activities prior to the date of his alleged "appointment" as a justice court 
judge in Box Elder County on December 8, 2008. Because Marx never had any legal 
authority to make any rulings, enter any orders, enter any judgments, assess any fines, 
assess any penalties, impose any jail time, and/or engage in any other legal activities, prior 
to the date of his alleged "appointment" as a justice court judge in Box Elder County on 
December 8, 2008, all rulings he made, all orders he entered, all judgments he entered, all 
fines he assessed, all penalties he assessed, all jail time he imposed, and all other legal 
activities he engaged in, while acting as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, prior to 
the date of his alleged "appointment" as a justice court judge in Box Elder County on 
December 8, 2008, are void as a matter of law. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter 
of law when it ruled that any rulings Marx made, any orders he entered, any judgments he 
entered, any fines he assessed, any penalties he assessed, any jail time he imposed, or any 
other purported legal actions he engaged in, while purporting to act as a justice court judge 
in Box Elder County, prior to the date of his alleged "appointment" as a justice court judge 
in Box Elder County on December 8, 2008, are invalid and void as a matter of law. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT 
ANY RULINGS MADE, ORDERS ENTERED, JUDGMENTS ENTERED, FINES 
ASSESSED, PENALTIES ASSESSED, JAIL TIME IMPOSED, OR ANY OTHER 
PURPORTED LEGAL ACTIONS ENGAGED IN BY MARX, PRIOR TO THE 
DATE OF HIS ALLEGED APPOINTMENT AS A JUSTICE COURT JUDGE IN 
BOX ELDER COUNTY ON DECEMBER 8, 2008, COULD BE RETROACTIVELY 
VALIDATED BY THE BOX ELDER COUNTY COMMISSION 
When the trial court dismissed Mr. Pett's Petition for Extraordinary Relief, it in effect 
ruled that the alleged appointment of Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder County on 
December 8, 2008, retroactively validated all of the rulings he made, all of the orders he 
entered, all of the Judgments he entered, all of the fines he assessed, all of the penalties he 
imposed, all of the jail time he imposed, and all other purported legal actions he engaged in, 
while he was purporting to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, prior to the 
date of his alleged "appointment" as a justice court judge in Box Elder County on 
December 8, 2008. That conclusion is absolutely wrong, as a matter of law. 
In its June 15, 2009, Memorandum Decision, the trial court states: 
At the time of his temporary appointment in Box Elder County, Judge Marx held 
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office and currently holds office as a justice court judge in Hyde Park, which is 
withing the First Judicial District. The appointment of Judge Marx was ratified by 
the Box Elder County Commission. Therefore, Judge Marx was properly appointed 
to act as a temporary Judge for the Box Elder County Justice Court. 
As this Court stated in Holm. Judge Eves could not retroactively validate 
Commissioner Lema's unlawful actions. Likewise, in this case the Box Elder County 
Commission could not retroactively validate Cliristensen's imlawflil appointment of Marx as 
a justice court judge in Box Elder County. Nor could the Box Elder County Commission 
retroactively validate Marx's unlawful actions in which he engaged prior to his alleged 
appointment as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, by appointing him to act as a 
justice court judge in Box Elder County on December 8, 2008, even assuming, arguendo, 
that his alleged appointment was valid. 
The Box Elder County Commission has absolutely no authority to retroactively 
validate any of Cliristensen's unlawful actions or retroactively validate any of the rulings 
Marx made, any of the orders he entered, any of the judgments he entered, any of the fines 
he assessed, any of the penalties he imposed, any of the jail time he imposed, and any other 
purported legal actions he engaged in, while he was purporting to act as a justice court 
judge in Box Elder County, prior to the date of his alleged "appointment" as a justice court 
judge in Box Elder County on December 8, 2008. Therefore, the trial court erred as a matter 
of law when it dismissed Mr. Pett's Petition for Extraordinary Relief and ruled that the Box 
Elder County Commission could retroactively validate Cliristensen's unlawful appointment 
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of Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder County. The trial court also erred as matter of 
law when it ruled that the Box Elder County Commission could retroactively validate all of 
the rulings Marx made, all of the orders he entered, all of the Judgments he entered, all of 
the fines he assessed, all of the penalties he imposed, all of the jail time he imposed, and all 
other purported legal actions he engaged in, while he was purporting to act as a justice court 
judge in Box Elder County, prior to the date of his alleged "appointment" as a justice court 
judge in Box Elder County on December 8, 2008. 
Because the trial court erred, as a matter of law, when it dismissed Mr. Pett's Petition 
for Extraordinary Relief, and ruled that the Box Elder County Commission could 
retroactively validate Christensen's unlawful appointment of Marx as a justice court judge 
in Box Elder County, and that the Box Elder County Commission could retroactively 
validate all of the rulings Marx made, all of the orders he entered, all of the Judgments he 
entered, all of the fines he assessed, all of the penalties he imposed, all of the jail time he 
imposed, and all other purported legal actions he engaged in, while he was purporting to act 
as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, prior to the date of his alleged "appointment" 
as a justice court judge in Box Elder County on December 8, 2008, Mr. Pert respectfully 
asserts that this Court must reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this case to 
the trial court, with instructions to enter a judgment holding that the Box Elder County 
Commission could not lawfully retroactively validate Christensen's unlawful appointment 
of Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, and that Marx's alleged 
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appointment as a justice court judge in Box Elder County on December 8, 2008, as a matter 
of law, did not, and could not retroactively validate any of the rulings Marx made, any of 
the orders he entered, any of the judgments he entered, any of the fines he assessed, any of 
the penalties he imposed, any of the jail time he imposed, and any other purported legal 
actions he engaged in, while he was purporting to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder 
County, prior to the date of his alleged "appointment" as a justice court judge in Box Elder 
County on December 8, 2008. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it ruled that Marx was lawfully 
appointed as a "temporary justice court judge " by the Box Elder County Commission at 
the December 8, 2008 Commission meeting, when the Commission failed to comply with 
provisions of UCA §78A-2-202 when attempting to appoint Marx as a "temporaryjustice 
court judge" in Box Elder County. The trial court also erred as a matter of law when it 
ruled that Marx' appointment as a "temporary justice court judge " by Judge Christensen 
could be retroactively validated by the Box Elder County Commission. The trial court 
further erred as a matter of law when it ruled that any rulings made, orders entered, 
judgments entered, fines assessed, penalties assessed, jail time imposed, or any other 
purported legal actions engaged in by Marx, while purporting to act as a justice court judge 
in Box Elder County, prior to the date of his alleged appointment as a justice court judge in 
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Box Eder County on December 8, 2008, could be retroactively validated by the Box Elder 
County Commission. 
Because the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the Box Elder County 
Commission lawfully appointed Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, on 
December 8, 2008, because the trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the Box 
Elder County Commission could retroactively validate Christensen's appoint of Marx as a 
justice court judge in Box Elder County, and because the trial court erred as a matter of law 
when it ruled that the Box Elder County Commission could retroactively validate any of 
Marx's rulings made, orders entered, judgments entered, fines assessed, penalties assessed, 
jail time imposed, or any other purported legal actions engaged in by Marx, while 
purporting to act as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, prior to the date of his 
alleged appointment as a justice court judge in Box Eder County on December 8, 2008, this 
Court must reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand this case back to the trial court 
with instructions to enter an order declaring that Marx was not lawfully appointed as a 
justice court judge by the Box Elder County Commission on December 8, 2008, that the 
Box Elder County Commission could not retroactively validate Christensen's appointment 
of Marx as a justice court judge in Box Elder County, and mat the Box Elder County 
Commission could not retroactively validate any of Marx's rulings made, orders entered, 
judgments entered, fines assessed, penalties assessed, jail time imposed, or any other 
purported legal actions engaged in by Marx, while purporting to act as a justice court judge 
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in Box Elder County, prior to the date of his alleged appointment as a justice court judge in 
Box Eder County on December 8,2008. 
5 
Respectfully submitted thisc^_ day of April 2010. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Robert Pert 
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Charles A. Schultz, U.S.B. #4760 
Attorney for Robert Pett 
222 West 700 South 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Telephone: 435.225.2636 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT PETT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM CITY CORPORATION, BOX 
ELDER COUNTY CORPORATION and 
DAVHD MARX, 
PETITION FOR EXTRA ORDINAR Y 
RELIEF PURSUANT TO RULE 
65B(d)(2)(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Case Number: 
Judge: 
. fao'l^7-82-
COMES NOW, Robert Pett (hereinafter, Mr. Pett) and pursuant to the provisions of 
Rule 65B(d))(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, moves this court an order 
declaring all decisions, mlings and other actions, of any legal nature whatsoever, taken by 
David Marx wliile purporting to act as a justice of the peace (jop) in the Brigham City 
Justice Court and/or the Box Elder County Justice Court to be null and void ab initio. 
INTERESTED PARTIES TO THE PETITION 
The various people and entities known to Mr. Pert whose interests might be 
substantially affected by this Petition include: the Brigham City Corporation, The Box Elder 
County Corporation and David Marx. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Issues Presented: 
1. Does jop Marx have any authority to act as a jop in the Box Elder County Justice 
Court? 
2. Are all decisions, mlings and other actions, of any legal nature whatsoever, taken 
by David Marx while purporting to act as a justice of the peace (jop) in the Box Elder 
County Justice Court null and void ab initio? 
Relief Requested: 
Mr. Pert requests that this Court issue an order declaring that all decisions, mlings, 
orders, fines, sentences, and/or other actions, of any legal nature whatsoever, taken by 
David Marx while purporting to act as a justice of the peace (jop) in the Box Elder County 
Justice Court to be null and void ab initio and of no force and affect due to Marx's lack of 
jurisdiction to act as a jop in the Box Elder County Justice Court, thereby rendering all 
decisions, rulings, orders, fines, sentences, and/or other actions, of any legal nature 
whatsoever, taken by David Marx while purporting to act as a justice of the peace (jop) in 
the Box Elder County Justice Court to be null and void as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 17, 2008, Mr. Pett was given a citation requiring him to appear in the 
Box Elder County Justice court. 
2. Mr. Pett appeared on July 26, 2008 and plead not guilty to the charges in the 
citation. 
3. At the July 26, 2008 hearing, Mr. Pett requested a formal information be given 
him so he could have a copy of the charges and the case number of the case. 
4. Mr. Pett received a copy of the information in Case No. 081002646 MO sometime 
after the July 26, 2008 hearing. 
5. Upon receiving a copy of the information and the case number. Mr. Pert filed a Motion 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 29A of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to disqualify 
Kevin Christensen as acting as the jop in the case. 
6. Although Christensen never officially recused himself from the case, or if he did 
Mr. Pett was never provided with a copy of Christensen's recusal, jop Marx is the person 
who has been representing himself as the jop in case No. 081002646 MO, ever since Mr. Pett 
filed his Motion to Disqualify Christensen, and Marx has proceeded to act as the jop in the case. 
7. According the Utah Court's web site, Marx is a jop in Hyde Park and North 
Logan, in Cache County. He is not a jop in Box Elder County. 
8. Marx has never been appointed to act as an interim jop, a special jop, a 
replacement jop or any other type of jop in the Box Elder County Justice Court. See the 
Affidavit of Robert Pett, a copy of which is attached to this Petition as Exhibit 2. 
9. Marx has never been certified by the Judicial Council to act as a jop in the Box 
Elder Justice Court. 
NECESSTTY FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
Mr. Pett is entitled to extraordinary relief in this matter because Marx is acting as a jop, in 
the Box Elder Justice Court, in direct violation of the express provisions of UCA §78A-7-104 and 
78A-7-202. Therefore none of Vlarx's decisions, rulings, orders, fines, sentences, and/or other 
actions, of any legal nature whatsoever, are valid, and Mr. Pett is, therefore, being deprived of 
-4. 
his Constitutional right to legal trial before an actual judge. Because, Marx has no authority to 
even consider any challenge to his authority to act as a jop, made by Mr. Pett, Mr. Pett must come 
to this Court to have it mle that Marx is without any jurisdiction to act as a jop m the Box Elder 
County Justice Court. 
Mr. Pett cannot wait until a decision on the charges against him is entered in the jop court 
and then file an appeal from the guilty verdict, that is always rendered m jop court, because under 
the holding of Hardy v Meadows. 71 Utah 255, 264 P. 968, 974, wherein the Supreme 
Court stated: 
The effect of the holdings in all these cases is that the jurisdiction of the district 
court of a cause on appeal from a justice's court or other inferior court is derivative 
and as is held in many other jurisdictions; that if the inferior court had not 
jurisdiction of the cause and of the subject-matter therein presented, the district 
court acquired no jurisdiction thereof by appeal: * * * " (Emphasis added). 
this Court will not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the jop court never had 
jurisdiction and this Court's jurisdiction on appeal is predicated on the jurisdiction of the 
justice court. 
Additionally, in 63 P.3d 120; State v Rees: 2003 UT App 4, the Court declared: 
Trial de novo m a district court mav not always he a "plum, speedy, and adequate 
remedy.n Id. Thus, m truly exceptional circumstances, a individual mav "correctly 
seek I ] relief m the form of a petition for extraordinary relief' to challenge a 
justice court nilmg Cahan v Bovden, 2003 UT App 'l!6, 2003 WL 212X9369 
(mem j (per curiam) (Emphasis added). 
o -
Therefore, this Court must grant Mr. Pett's Petition for Extraordinary Relief. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF 
In pertinent part, UCA §78A-7-104 provides: 
Justice court judges: 
(1) have the same authority regarding matters within their jurisdiction as judges of courts 
of record; 
(2) may issue search warrants and warrants of arrest upon a finding of probable cause; 
and (3) may conduct proceedings to determine: 
(a) probable cause for any case within their jurisdiction; and 
(b) an accused person's release on bail or his own recognizance (Emphasis added). 
In pertinent part, UCA §78A-7-105 provides: 
(1) The territorial jurisdiction of county justice courts extends to the limits of the precinct 
for which the justice court is created and includes all cities or towns within the precinct, 
except cities where a municipal justice court exists. 
(2) The territorial jurisdiction of municipal justice courts extends to the corporate limits of 
the municipality in which the justice court is created. (Emphasis added). 
In pertinent part Rule 29(c)(2) URCri.P provides: 
(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall without 
further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the motion and 
affidavit to a reviewing judge. If the judge grants the motion, the order shall direct 
the presiding judge of the court or\ if the court has no presiding judge, the presiding 
officer of the Judicial Council to assign another judge to the action or hearing. 
Assignment injustice court cases shall be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. 
§78-5-138. (Emphasis added). 
. * -
UCA §78-5-138 was replaced with §78A-7-202 in January 2008, and UCA §78A-7-202 
now provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
Vacancy. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Appointing authority" means: 
(i) for a county: 
(A) the chair of the county commission in a county operating under the county 
commission or expanded county commission form of county government: 
(B) the county executive in a county operating under the county executive-council 
form of county government; and 
(C) the county manager m a county operating under the council-manager form of 
county government; and 
(n) for a city or town, the mayor of the city or town. 
(b) "Local legislative body" means: 
(i) for a county, the county commission or county council; and 
00 for a city or town, the council of the city or town. 
(2) Justice court judges shall be appointed by the appointing authority and 
confirmed by a majority vote of the local legislative body 
(3) (a) After a newly appointed justice court judge has been confirmed, the local 
legislative body shall report the confirmed judged name to the Judicial Council. 
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(b) The Judicial Council shall certify the judge as qualified to hold office upon 
successful completion of the orientation program and upon the written opinion of 
the county or municipal attorney that the judge meets the statutory qualifications for 
office. 
(c) A justice court nidge may not perform judicial duties until certified by the 
Judicial Council (Emphasis added). 
The former UCA §78-5-138, the statutory provision specifying the procedure for 
appointment of a temporary j op specified: 
If a justice court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority may 
appoint another justice court judge currently holding office within the county to 
serve as a temporary justice court judge. A retired justice court judge may also be 
appointed as temporary justice court judge under rule of the Supreme Court. 
The indisputable facts clearly and unequivocally prove that Marx has no authority to 
act as a jop in the Box Elder County Justice court. Therefore, as a matter of law, no 
decisions, no rulings, no orders, no fines, no sentences, and/or no other actions, of any legal 
nature whatsoever, taken, directed, imposed, or issued by David Marx while purporting to 
act as a justice of the peace (jop) in the Box Elder County Justice Court are valid. 
UCA §78A-7-104(1) provides thatjops only "have the same authority regarding matters 
within their jurisdiction as judges of courts of record. " (Emphasis added). 
UCA §78-5-138(2) specifies i( Justice court judges shall be appointed by the 
appointing authority and confirmed by a majority vote of the local legislative body. " 
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UCA §78-5-138(3)(a) specifies: "After a newly appointed justice court judge has been 
confirmed, the local legislative body shall report the confirmed judge's name to the 
Judicial Council" UCA §78-5-138(3)(c) specifies: Ajustice court judge may not perform 
judicial duties until certified by the Judicial Council. 
Because Marx has not been appointed to act as any sort or type of jop in the Box 
Elder Justice Court or confirmed as a jop for the Box Elder Justice Court, as mandated by 
UCA §78-5-138(2), he has no authority or jurisdiction to act as a jop in the Box Elder 
Justice Court. Because Marx has not been certified to the Judicial Council, by the Box 
Elder County Commission, to act as any sort or type of jop in the Box Elder Justice Court, 
as mandated by UCA §78-5-138(3)(a), he has no authority or jurisdiction to act as a jop in 
the Box Elder Justice Court. Because Marx has not been certified by the Judicial Council to 
act as a jop in the Box Elder Justice Court, as mandated by UCA §78-5-13 8(3)(c), he has 
no authority or jurisdiction to act as a jop in the Box Elder Justice Court. Therefore, as a 
matter of law, no decisions, no rulings, no orders, no fines, no sentences, and/or no other 
actions, of any legal nature whatsoever, taken, directed, imposed, or issued by David 
Marx while purporting to act as ajustice of the peace jop in the Box Elder County Justice 
Court are valid. 
Utah appellate courts have long held that any judgment, ruling, sentence, decision, 
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fine or order entered by a court without jurisdiction is void as a matter of law. See, e.g., 
110 P.2d 558 State Tax Comm v Larsen 100 Utah 10. Therefore, under the facts of this 
case, it is undeniable that all decisions, all rulings, all orders, all fines, all sentences, and/or 
all other actions, of any legal nature whatsoever, taken, directed, imposed, or issued by 
David Marx while purporting to act as a justice of the peace (jop) in the Box Elder County 
Justice Court are invalid, of no effect or force and are void as a matter of law. Therefore, 
this Court must grant Mr. Pett's Petition for Extraordinary Relief and issue a ruling 
declaring all decisions, all mlings, all orders, all fines, all sentences, and/or all other actions, 
of any legal nature whatsoever, taken, directed, imposed, or issued by David Marx while 
purporting to act as a justice of the peace (jop) in the Box Elder County Justice Court are 
null, void and of no force and/or effect whatsoever. 
Dated this _if! December 2008. 
—> 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Robert J. Pett 
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STATE OF UTAH } 
.ss 
COUNTY OF BOX ELDER } 
Robert Pett, being first sworn upon his oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I, Robert Pett, have personal knowledge of the facts set forth in this Affidavit and 
would so testify, if called on to do so at trial of this matter. 
2. I have personally reviewed all of the minutes of the meetings of the Box Elder County 
Commission from January 1, 2008 through today's date and there is no record in any of the 
meetings where the Commission appointed any person to act as a Justice of the Peace (jop) in Box 
Elder County, either as an interim jop, a special jop, a replacement jop, a jop pro tem, or any 
other type of jop in the Box Elder County Justice Court. 
3. I have also personally reviewed all of the minutes of the meetings of the Brigham City 
Council from June 1, 1997 through today's date and there is no record in any of the meetings 
where the Council appointed any person to act as a jop in the Brigham City Justice Court, either 
as an interim jop, a special jop, a replacement jop, a jop pro tem, or any other type of jop in 
the Box Elder County Justice Court. 
Dated this %5f of November 2008. 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT PETT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM CITY CORPORATION, 
BOX ELDER COUNTY CORPORATION 
and DAVID MARX, 
Respondents. I 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 080101282 
Judge: Kevin K. Allen 
THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Petitioner Robert Pett's Petition 
for Extraordinary Relief 'under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 65B(d)(2)(a). In preparation for its 
decision, the Court reviewed each document submitted by the parties, the Petition, Opposition 
Memoranda, appUcable case law, and statutory provisions. Having considered the foregoing, the 
Court issues this Memorandum Decision. 
Under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, "[wjhere no other plain, speedy and adequate 
remedy is available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the grounds 
set forth in paragraph . . . (d ) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority, the failure to 
exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of Pardons and Parole)." Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(a). Furthermore, "[appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior court, 
administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion." Id. 65B(d)(2). 
Petitioner requests that this Court issue an order to declare that all ''decisions, rulings and 
1 
other actions, of any legal nature whatsoever.'' by Judge David Marx, while acting as a temporary 
justice court judge in the Brigham City and/or Box Elder County Justice Court, are null and void. 
In the original case in Box Elder County Justice Court, Defendant (now Petitioner) moved to 
have Judge Kevin Christensen recused. The motion was granted, and Judge Marx was appointed 
to the case as a replacement. Subsequently, Judge Marx granted a motion to disqualify Mr. 
Charles Schultz as Mr. Robert Pett's counsel because Mr. Schultz was a material witness and/or 
co-defendant in the case. Petitioner argues that according to State statutes, proper procedures and 
rules for appointing a justice court judge were not followed in regards to Judge Marx, and 
therefore all actions taken by him in this capacity are of no effect and should be declared null and 
void. 
Utah law provides for the appointment of a temporary justice court judge: "[i]f a justice 
court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority may appoint another justice court 
judge currently holding office within the judicial district to serve as a temporary justice court 
judge." Utah Code Ann. § 78A-7-208. The "appointing authority" is the local government 
executive. Id. § 78A-7-202(2)(d). "Local government executive" means: 
[F]or a county: (A) the chair of the county commission in a county operating under 
the county commission or expanded county commission form of county government; 
(B) the county executive in a county operating under the county executive-council 
form of county government; and (C) the county manager in a county operating under 
the council-manager form of county government; and (ii) for a city or town, the 
mayor of the city or town. 
Id. § 78A-7-202(l)(a). Also, when the local government executive appoints a judge, the 
appointment shall be ratified by the local legislative body. Id. § 78A-7-202(2)(d). The "local 
legislative body5' for a county is the county commission or county council, and for a city or town 
o 
~ 
is the city or town council. Id 202(1 )(b). 
The Court finds that Judge Marx has not exceeded his jurisdiction while acting as a 
temporary judge in the Box Elder County Justice Court. At the time of his temporary 
appointment in Box Elder County, Judge Marx held office and currently holds office as a justice 
court judge in Hyde Park, which is within the First Judicial District. The appointment of Judge 
Marx was ratified by the Box Elder County Commission. Therefore, Judge Marx was properly 
appointed to act as a temporary Judge for the Box Elder County Justice Court. 
The Court notes that in arguments contained in the Supporting Memorandum for the 
Petition, Mr. Schultz, counsel for Petitioner, quotes and relies heavily upon parts of the Utah 
Code that have been either amended or repealed, to the detriment of his arguments. The Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure state: 
[B]y presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper to the court (whether by 
signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney or unrepresented party is 
certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed 
after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,... (2) the claims, defenses, and 
other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of 
new law.. . . 
11(b) (emphasis added). Additionally, the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct state that "[a] 
lawyer shall not knowingly:... (2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the 
controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client 
and not disclosed by opposing counsel." 3.3(a). 
Even after acknowledging that the statute had been recently renumbered, Mr. Schultz 
erroneously represented old statutory- language for the current law. Additionally, Petitioner's 
Memoranda contained numerous citation errors that misled and caused confusion to the Court. 
3 
Furthermore, the Court acknowledges, as Respondents' noted in their Response, that Mr. 
Schultz, in his Memoranda, disrespectfully refused to refer to Judge Marx by his proper title of 
"Judge." 
Therefore, the Petition for Extraordinary Relief is dismissed. Furthermore, in review of 
the conduct of Petitioner's counsel, the Court will refer this case to the Utah Bar for further 
investigation and possible disciplinary action against Mr. Schultz. Counsel for the Respondents is 
directed to prepare an order in conformance herewith. 
Dated this /fT day of June, 2009. *r«rr^ 
4 
Michael E. Christiansen #10262 
Zions Bank Building-98 North Main 
P.O. Box 876 
Brigham City, Utah 84302-0876 
Telephone: 435-723-3404 
Facsimile: 435-723-7066 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT PETT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRIGHAM CITY CORP., BOX ELDER 
COUNTY CORP., and DAVID MARX, 
Respondents. 
ORDER ON MEMORANDUM DECISION 
DATED JUNE 15,2009 
Case No. 080101282 
Judge Kevin K. Allen 
THE ABOVE MATTER came before the Court pursuant to Petitioner's Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 65B(d)(2)(a). The Court, having 
reviewed each document submitted by the parties, the Petition, the Opposition Memoranda, the 
applicable case law, and statutory provisions herein, now makes the following order. 
It is hereby; 
ORDERED. ADJUDGED and DECREED: 
1. Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Relief is dismissed. 
Pen vs Bngnam Cm e u l - Civil No 0801012S: 
Order on Memorandum Decision Datec June 15 2009 
2. The Court refers this case to the Utah Bar for further investigation and possible 
disciplinary action against Mr Schultz 
DATED this 2P\_ day of June, 2009. 
BY THE COURT 
K Allen 
?b$TRICT COURT JUDGE 
Pett \ 3 BnenamCm et al Civil No 0801012S2 
Order on Memorandum Decision Dated June !«• 2009 
gfomimsttratibe 0liitt of tfje Courts 
Chief Justice Christine M. Durham Daniel J. Becker 
Utah Supreme Court State Court Administrator 
Chair, Utah Judicial Council June 3 0 , 2 0 0 9 Mjron K. March 
Deputy Court Administrator 
Charles A. Schultz 
222 West 700 south 
Brigham City, Utah 84203 
Dear Mr. Schultz: 
In relation to your letter dated June 19, 2009, our office does not have any information of 
the type that you have requested. Justice court judges did not go through the certification piocess 
this year. Occasionally, local authorities will appoint temporary justice court judges when a 
justice court judge is disqualified for some reason. You might want to talk to the appointing 
authority in Box Elder County to see if they have done any such appointments. They are not 
required to send that documentation to us. Please let me know if you have any additional 
questions. 
Sincerely, 
/ 
- /; 
Bp6nt Johnson 
General Counsel 
The mission of the Utah judicial-} is to provide the people an open, fair, 
efficient, and independent system for the advancement of justice under the law. 
jfL 222 33ip5t 700 -^nutl] ^ ^ 
J^^t Briglram CLitn, 33tali 34303 ^ ^ 
* CUh>phrmi>: 435.225.2636 ^ 
June 19, 2009 
Brent Johnson, General Counsel 
Administrative Office of the Courts 
450 South State Street 
P.O.Box 140241 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84114-0241 
Re: Letter of December 10. 2008 
Dear Mr. Johnson: 
Thank you for your letter of December 10, 2008 with respect to the appointments, 
confirmations, certification, etc. of justice court judges in Box Elder County during the 
time period of Januaiy 1, 2008 through December 10, 2008. It was of great help. (Copy 
enclosed). 
Would you please provide me with any documentation, forms, or other 
information indicating an} appointments, confirmations, certification, etc. of justice court 
judges in Box Elder Count}' during the time period of December 1L 2008 through the 
date of your reph ? Would you also provide me with all letters from the Box Elder 
Count}' Attorney certifying an}' individual as qualified to act as a justice court judge in 
Box Elder Count}' between December 11, 2008 and the dale of your reply? 
I believe that the requested information is a matter of public record, and I will 
greatly appreciate it if \ ou will provide me with the requested infomiation simph' based 
on this letter. However, if you require a subpoena or a GRAMA request, please tell me 
so. 1 shall provide you with the necessary documentation to permit you to provide me 
with the requested infomiation. 
Thank you for \ our assistance with this request. 
Res 
Charles A. Schultz 
TRANSCRIPT OF DECEMBER 8, 2008 BOX ELDER COUNTY 
COMMISSION MEETING APPOINTING DAVID MARX AS A 
TEMPORARY JUSTICE COURT JUDGE IN BOX ELDER COUNTY 
HIGH DESERT REPORTING SERVICES 
P.O. BOX 482 
NEW HARMONY, UTAH 84 75 7 
(435) 586-0830 
transcribed by Carole Yelton, RPR, CSR, Notary Public 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
25 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: Let's go ahead. Tell 
us about the appointment of David Marx as a justice 
court j udge. 
STEVEN HADFIELD: It's my -- it's my 
understanding that the Justice Court occasionally has a 
need to have another judge come and fill in, whether 
there's a conflict, whether the judge is out of town, 
whatever.the circumstance may be. 
I think what we're here to do today is just 
to have that appointment made so that that judge can 
function. 
The statute says that the appointing 
authority is the Chairman of the County Commission; 
that should be you. 
Once the appointment's made, a majority of 
the legislative body, which would be three of you, 
confirms the appointment. And so I think that's what 
we're here for. 
Is that right?-
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Yeah. We're - ^ ^^^^, 
a temporary justice court judge as opposed to pro tern. 
Yeah. There's -- there's two ways to bring in a --
another judge. Cne is through the Supreme Court, and 
1 I thau's the pro tern process. 
I 
2 I The other way is ]ust to appoint a temporary 
3 I justice court judge. Temporary justice -- doesn't give 
4 any kind of a time frame just to back up mostly for 
5 cases where I have to recuse myself. 
6 It's not being different from what we've been 
7 doing in the past as far as somebody coming in and 
8 start doing my work for me or anything like that. It's 
9 just that we wanted to make him official per the code 
10 is all. 
11 COMMISSIONER HARDING: Well, now, look, we 
12 have appointed replacements in the past. 
13 KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: We had -- years ago, we 
14 had Judge Nelson sworn in. I think he was called pro 
15 tern. That's what the courts were doing then. I'm not 
IS sure if that was really per the code, but that's what 
17 we had done. 
18 I -- I got a phone call last week that the 
19 state is actually asking the courts to make sure that 
20 their judges are -- are properly appointed. And so 
21 this comes from the state level to -- the court 
22 administrator's office is concerned about it. 
23 j So we just wanted to make it per the code is 
all. 
25 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: So, Steven, was there 
d 
i i change m the code or just this is brought: :o our 
awareness, and we need to rake action on it? 
UNIDENTIFIED FEMALE VOICE: (Inaudible.) 
STEVEN HADFIELD: There was a change, but 
I -- I think it was the same before the change. If you 
look at the code today, there's a section that's 
effective from the first of this year until the end, 
and then it changes again next year. 
So there was a change the first of the year, 
but I think it was -- and I haven't researched it out, 
but I think it was probably the same requirement. 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: What's the appointing 
period? Do you appoint on a calendar year or do you 
appoint and then they're appointed until they're 
released? 
STEVEN HADFIELD: It just says -- and there's 
really no -- it's says temporary, and there's really no 
definition of temporary. 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: I -- I think probably 
until they're released because the pro tern process that 
comes down from the Supreme Court, that makes it clear 
that it's on a per case basis just for that case. And 
they have to be sworn in as a pro tern on each 
individual case as opposed to this. 
And so where tney don't say per case, then I 
think uha: we're good jusi until in runs out or until 
we decide otherwise. 
STEVEN HADFIELB: I would agree with that. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: Would we appoint more 
5 I than one temporary --
6 | KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: If -- if you're going to 
7 I be using - -
8 COMMISSIONER HARDING: -- justice court 
9 judge? 
10 KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: If you're going to be 
11 using three or four throughout, you know, depending on 
12 the circumstances, you'd probably want to appoint more 
13 than one. 
14 All right. I think Peggy and I can talk 
15 about that. We'll look at that maybe down the road. I 
16 don't know that we need to do that today. 
17 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: And it's usually -- it's 
18 just if you have a conflict or if you have an overload 
19 or --
20 KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: I -- I've never had a 
21 judge come in and do work for me when I've been out of 
22 town. So it would just be when I -- when I've got a 
23 J conflict, not an overload, just to come in for a couple 
i 
24 • of hours to help me out in a case where I've had to 
recuse mvseir. 
a 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I'm sorry. It's -- it's 
under a separate -- separate contract then, and we're 
compensating this Temporary judge for when he does 
cover? I mean, it's not -- it's not just paying him 
for services? 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: No. Well, there is one 
judge where we traded. I -- I go to Logan if there's 
some cases for Judge Russell; she comes over and hears 
cases for me. We just -- we don't pay her. She 
doesn't pay me. 
But, for the most part, the judges are 
compensated, and we have been compensating Judge Marx. 
Judge Nelson has come in before; we've compensated him, 
so . 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I guess that was the 
reason for the question for maybe other temporary 
judges or the appointment of the temporary --
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Oh, we only compensate 
them if they come in and hear a case. So -- yeah. If 
they don't ever hear a case, they would never get any 
money. 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: How -- how much have we 
utilized Judge Marx in the past? 
- KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Oh, maybe half a dozen 
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COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: My question is 
obviously require -- requirements is -- he's, I assume, 
a certified judge? 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Yes. He's currently --
the -- the court requires that we bring in a judge who 
is currently a judge within the First Judicial 
District, which is Box Elder, Cache or Rich Counties. 
Judge Marx is at Hyde Park over in Cache 
County; so he qualifies under the code to come in. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: And so the 
qualifications of -- of using him or anybody that they 
have to be in the First --
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: They have to be in the 
First District, and they have to be a sitting judge. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: -- or -- or --
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: They can be a retired 
judge, I think it says. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: -- or -- but they have 
to have the certification? 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Exactly. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: Yes. 
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: And that's changed. 
The boundaries have changed. It used to be your 
I 
25 j jurisdiction. Right? 
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1 I KEVIN CKRISTSNSEN: Ill's -- well, I think 
2 it's probably been in place before January. I think it 
3 has just: been done and nobody has taken -- care is not 
4 the right word. 
5 But the -- the attorneys who have come in and 
6 the defendants who have come in have always just felt 
7 comfortable bringing in another judge. 
8 It's never been questioned. It's never 
9 really been thought about. You know, we deal with so 
10 many codes and so many things every day, I think it's 
11 just something that has just never really been thought 
12 about before. 
13 It had been brought to our attention like 
14 this after the state or administrator's office -- it's 
15 been brought to our attention through a pending case. 
16 And so we just want to make sure that it's -- it's done 
17 right. 
18 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: So, Steve, as I 
19 understand it then, the appointment would be to appoint 
20 David Marx as a temporary justice court judge, and then 
21 that appointment is indefinite? 
22 STEVEN HADFIELD: That's right. 
23 J COMMISSIONER DAVIS: That's right. 
24 ; STEVEN HADFIELD: Yes. And the appointment 
25 is made by the chairman, and then that appointment 
1 
be -- would be confirmed by a vo:e of the commission. 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: So we take a motion on 
that or do we nave further - - o r does the chairman make 
a recommendation to us that --
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: The chairman would 
appoint -- on the record, appoint the ]udge as the 
[judge, and then there would be a confirming vote taken. 
LUANN ADAMS: How do we do that? 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Yeah. How do we do 
that? 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: It sounds different, 
what we're 
LUANN ADAMS: We need a notification of that. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: Should I ask for a 
vote now and --
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: I think you could. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: -- and then -- and 
then go ahead and affirm and appoint and sign? 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Well, I think what we 
could do is we could make a motion to approve the 
chair's recommendation. 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: I believe tnat would 
work . 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Okay. - I make a 
motion chat we aoorove 
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: Before we get: to 
nhar:, I have a question. 
Are there other - - other potential appointees 
on the liso? Hopefully, one that's not as far away as 
Cache Valley. 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Hyde Park. Yeah. We --
Judge Nelson from Mantua has come in and helped before. 
Judge Marx is law trained, and so I feel more 
comfortable bringing him in on a lot of the cases. 
Some of the cases where I have to recuse 
myself are sometimes more complicated than others. And 
I've just felt real comfortable having him come in to 
do the cases. I think he does a good job. 
So, I mean, if, sometime down the road, you 
wanted to look at different people, I guess that would 
be a possibility too. 
STEVEN HADFIELD: Commissioner Van Dyke, are 
you asking shall we ask for competing proposals or a 
bid contracting for professional services? 
There's not that requirement. So, you know, 
based upon uhe judge's experience or the county 
attorney's experience, oftentimes we'll contract for 
professional services. 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Yeah. I - - I don': know 
1 I COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: Obviously, it's not a 
j 
2 j requirement. I see it is a . 
3 I KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: I don't know what 
4 proposal they would ever make. I mean, I don't - - I --
5 I don't think it's a -- a money issue. 
6 So I don't think they'd be saying I can do it 
7 for this much. I would hope that it -- more than 
8 anything, it would just be who I feel comfortable with. 
9 I mean, I don't know that it's -- it doesn't 
10 say that it's my decision, but I -- I -- I know the 
11 other judges in the other district just felt real 
12 comfortable with him coming in. So it's just -- it's 
13 purely just from my side that I've brought Judge Marx 
14 in. 
15 COMMISSIONER HARDING: Okay. I think we got 
16 this right. I'm gonna' try. With what you've told me, 
17 I would like to make a recommendation that we appoint 
18 David Marx as a temporary justice or judge. 
19 Now I would like to have a motion --
20 COMMISSIONER DAVIS: I'll -- I'll make the 
21 motion to approve the recommendation from the chair of 
22 the appointment of David Marx as temporary justice 
23 I court judge for Box Elder County. 
24 ! COMMISSIONER HARDING: I have a motion. Do I 
have a second? 
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: And I've struggled 
2 ; with this (inaudible) at the 11th hour. It's very -• 
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well, that's enough. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: I'll second the 
motion. All in favor say aye. 
(Ayes voiced.) 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: The motion carries. 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Did you vote for him 
then? 
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: No, I didn't. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: He voted to --
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: You didn't mean to, did 
you? Three should be enough. 
COMMISSIONER VAN DYKE: So that would be a 
nay. 
COMMISSIONER DAVIS: Nay. 
COMMISSIONER HARDING: Okay. Okay. Motion 
carries. Thank you. 
KEVIN CHRISTENSEN: Okay. I do appreciate 
it . 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON ) 
ss . 
BE IT KNOWN chat the foregoing audio 
recorded proceedings were transcribed by me, CAROLE 
YELTON, a Notary Public in the County of Washington, 
for the State of Utah, from a CD audio recording 
received directly from the Box Elder County Recorder's 
Office; that the foregoing 12 pages are a true and 
correct transcript of said proceedings, all done to the 
best of my skill and ability. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am in no way 
related to any of the parties hereto; nor am I in any 
way interested in the outcome hereof. 
DATED at New Harmony, Utah, this 5th day 
of January, 2010. 
Xkmh &X.Q \A $ 
Notarxf Public 
My commission expires 
February 27, 2011 
i'-xan Public 
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78A-V102 bupieme Court junsdiction 
f 1) The Supieme Court has ongmal jurisdiction to answer questions of stare 
law certified b} a court of the United States 
(2) The Supieme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs 
and authont) to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its orders, 
judgments, and decrees or in aid of its junsdiction 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate junsdiction, including junsdiction of 
interlocutor) appeals. o\ei 
(a) a judgment ot the Court of Appeals, 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to final 
judgment by the Court of Appeals, 
(c) discipline of lawyers, 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission, 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating 
with 
(I) the Public Service Commission, 
(u) the State Tax Commission, 
(m) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, 
(v) the state engineer, or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources reviewing 
actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands, 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e), 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holdmg a statute of the 
United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution, 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felon), 
(I ) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degiee felony or capital felony, 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court 
of Appeals does not have original appellate junsdiction, and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees ruling on 
legislate e subpoenas 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals an) of the matters 
over which the Supreme Court has onginal appellate junsdiction. except 
(a) capital felony conuctions or an appeal of an interlocutor)' order of a court 
of lecoid invoking a charge of a capital felony, 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition for 
writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review 
those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, 
Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 
78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to 
issue all writs and process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings 
of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative 
proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Tmstees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state 
engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or 
other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except 
those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record m criminal cases, except those involving a 
conviction or charge of a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons 
who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions 
constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the 
decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, 
but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, 
parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
78-5-138. Temporary'justice court judge. 
If a justice court judge is absent or disqualified, the appointing authority may-
appoint another justice court judge currently holding office within the judicial 
district to serve as a temporary justice court judge. A retired justice court judge 
may also be appointed as a temporary justice court judge under rule of the 
Supreme Court. 
78A-7-104. Justice court judge authority. 
Justice court judges: 
(1) have the same authority regarding matters within their junsdiction as judges 
of courts of record; 
(2) may issue search warrants and warrants of arrest upon a finding of probable 
cause; and 
(3) may conduct proceedings to determine: 
(a) probable cause for any case within their jurisdiction; and 
(b) an accused person's release on bail or his own recognizance. 
78A-7-105. Territorial jurisdiction - Voting. 
(1) The territorial jurisdiction of county justice courts extends to the limits of 
the precinct for which the justice court is created and includes all cities or towns 
within the precinct, except cities where a municipal justice court exists. 
(2) The territorial jurisdiction of municipal justice courts extends to the 
corporate limits of the municipality in which the justice court is created. 
(3) The territorial jurisdiction of county and municipal justice courts 
functioning as magistrates extends beyond the boundaries in Subsections (1) and 
(2): 
(a) as set forth in Section 78A-2-220; and 
(b) to the extent necessary to carry out magisterial functions under Subsection 
77-7-23(2) regarding jailed persons. 
(4) For election of county justice court judges, all registered voters in the 
county justice court precinct may vote at the judge's retention election. 
78 A- 7-106 Jurisdiction 
H ) Justice courts have jurisdiction over class B and C misdemeanors, violation of 
ordinances, and infractions committed withm their temtorial jurisdiction by a person 
18 vears of age or older. 
(2) Except those offenses over which the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction, 
justice courts have jurisdiction over the following class B and C misdemeanors, 
violation of ordinances, and infractions committed withm their temtorial jurisdiction 
by a person 16 years of age or older: 
fa) Title 23. Wildlife Resources Code of Utah; 
(b) Title 41, Chapter la, Motor Vehicle Act; 
(c) Title 41, Chapter 6a, Traffic Code; 
(d) Title 41, Chapter 12a, Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act; 
(e) Title 41, Chapter 22, Off-Highway Vehicles; 
(f) Title 73. Chapter 18, Safe Boating Act; 
(g) Title 73, Chapter 18a5 Boating - Litter and Pollution Control; 
(h) Title 73, Chapter 18b, Water Safety; and 
(i) Title 73, Chapter 18c, Financial Responsibility of Motorboat Owners and 
Operators Act. 
(3) Justice Courts have jurisdiction over class C misdemeanor violations of Title 
53, Chapter 3. Part 2, Driver Licensing Act. 
(4) As used in this section, "the court's jurisdiction" means the territorial 
jurisdiction of a justice court. 
(5) An offense is committed within the territorial jurisdiction of a justice court if: 
(a) conduct constituting an element of the offense or a result constituting an 
element of the offense occurs withm the court's jurisdiction, regardless of whether the 
conduct or result is itself unlawful; 
f'b) either a person committing an offense or a victim of an offense is located withm 
the court's jurisdiction at the time the offense is committed; 
(c) either a cause of injury occurs within the court's jurisdiction or the injury occurs 
within the court's jurisdiction; 
(d) a person commits any act constituting an element of an inchoate offense withm 
the court's jurisdiction, including an agreement in a conspiracy; 
(e) a person solicits, aids, or abets, or attempts to solicit, aid, or abet another person 
m the planning or commission of an offense withm the court's jurisdiction; 
(T) the investigation of the offense does not readily indicate in which court's 
jurisdiction the offense occurred, and: 
(I) the offense is committed upon or m any railroad car, vehicle, watercraft or 
aircraft passing withm the court's jurisdiction; 
i n) i'A) the offense is committed on or in any body of water bordering on or withm 
this state if the territorial limits of the justice court are adjacent to the body of water, 
and 
(B) &s used in Subsection (3)(f)(ii)(A), "body of water" mcludes any stream, river, 
lake, or reservoir, whether natural or man-made; 
(in) a person who commits theft exercises control over the affected property within 
the court's jurisdiction; or 
(IV) the offense is committed on or near the boundary of the court's jurisdiction; 
(g) the offense consists of an unlawful communication that was initiated or 
received 
within the court's jurisdiction; or 
(h) jurisdiction is otherwise specifically provided by law. 
(6) Justice courts have jurisdiction of small claims cases under Title 78A, Chapter 
8, Small Claims Courts, if a defendant resides in or the debt arose within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the justice court. 
(7) A justice court judge may transfer a matter in which the defendant is a child to 
the juvenile court for further proceedings after judgment in the justice court. 
Rule 19. Extraordinary writs. 
(a) Petition for extraordinary writ to a judge or agency; petition; service and filing. 
An application for an extraordinary writ referred to in Rule 65B, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, directed to a judge, agency, person or entity shall be made by 
filing a petition with the clerk of the appellate court. Service of the petition shall 
be made on the respondent judge, agency, person, or entity and on all parties to the 
action or case in the trial court or agency. In the event of an original petition in the 
appellate court where no action is pending in the trial court or agency, the petition 
shall be served personally on the respondent judge, agency, person or entity' and 
service shall be made by the most direct means available on all persons or 
associations whose interests might be substantially affected. 
(I)) Contents of petition and filing fee. A petition for an extraordinary writ shall 
contain the following: 
(b)( 1) A statement of all persons or associations, by name or by class, whose 
interests might be substantially affected; 
(b)(2) A statement of the issues presented and of the relief sought; 
(b)(3) A statement of the facts necessary to an understanding of the issues 
presented by the petition; 
(b)(4) A statement of the reasons why no other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy 
exists and why the writ should issue; 
(b)(5) Except in cases where the writ is directed to a district court, a statement 
explaining why it is impractical or inappropriate to file the petition for a writ in the 
district court; 
(b)(6) Copies of any order or opinion or parts of the record which may be essential 
to an understanding of the matters set forth in the petition; 
(b)(7) A memorandum of points and authorities in support of the petition; and 
(b)(8) The prescribed filing fee, unless waived by the court. 
(b)(9) Where emergency relief is sought, the petition must comply with Rule 
8A(b), including any additional requirements set forth by that subpart. 
(b)( 10) Where the subject of the petition is an interlocutory order, the petition 
must state whether a petition for interlocutory appeal has been filed and, if so, 
summarize its status or, if not, state why interlocutory appeal is not a plain, 
speedy or adequate remedy. 
(c) Response to petition . The judge, agency, person, or entity and all parties in the 
action other than the petitioner shall be deemed respondents for all purposes. Two 
or more respondents may respond jointly. If any respondent does not desire to 
appear in the proceedings, that respondent may advise the clerk of the appellate 
court and all parties by letter, but the allegations of the petition shall not thereby 
be deemed admitted. Where emergency relief is sought, Rule 8A(d) shall apply. 
Otherwise, within seven days after service of the petition, any respondent or any 
other party may file a response in opposition or concurrence, which includes 
supporting authority. 
(d) Review and disposition of petition. The court shall render a decision based on 
the petition and any timely response, or it may require briefing or the submission 
of further information, and may hold oral argument at its discretion. If additional 
briefing is required, the briefs shall comply with Rules 24 and 27. Rule 8A(f) 
applies to requests for hearings in emergency matters. With regard to emergency 
petitions submitted under Rule 8A, and where consultation with other members of 
the court cannot be timely obtained, a single judge or justice may grant or deny the 
petition, subject to review by the court at the earliest possible time. With regard to 
all petitions, a single judge or justice may deny the petition if it is frivolous on its 
face or fails to materially comply with the requirements of this rule or Rule 65B, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The denial of a petition by a single judge or justice 
may be reviewed by the appellate court upon specific request filed within seven 
days of notice of disposition, but such request shall not include any additional 
argument or briefing. 
(e) Transmission of record. In reviewing a petition for extraordinary writ, the 
appellate court may order the record, or any relevant portion thereof, to be 
transmitted. 
(f) Number of copies. For a petition presented to the Supreme Court, petitioner 
shall file with the clerk of the court an original and five copies of the petition. For 
a petition pending m the Supreme Court, respondent shall file with the clerk of the 
court an original and five copies of the response. For a petition presented to the 
Court of Appeals, petitioner shall file with the clerk of the court an original and 
four copies of the petition. For a petition pending in the Court of Appeals, 
respondent shall file with the clerk of the court an original and four copies of the 
response. 
(g) Issuance of extraordinary writ by appellate court sua sponte. The appellate 
court, in aid of its own jurisdiction in extraordinary cases, may issue a writ of 
certiorari sua sponte directed to a judge, agency, person, or entity. A copy of the 
writ shall be served on the named respondents in the manner and by an individual 
authorized to accomplish personal service under Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In addition, copies of the writ shall be transmitted by the clerk of the 
appellate court, by the most direct means available, to all persons or associations 
whose interests might be substantially affected by the writ. The respondent and the 
persons or associations whose interests are substantially affected may, within four 
days of the issuance of the writ, petition the court to dissolve or amend the writ 
The petition shall be accompanied by a concise statement of the reasons for 
dissolution or amendment of the writ. 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is 
available, a person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of the 
grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful restraint on personal 
liberty), paragraph (c) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate 
authority) or paragraph (d) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority, the 
failure to exercise such authority, and actions by the Board of Pardons and Parole). 
There shall be no special fonn of writ. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, 
the procedures in this rule shall govern proceedings on all petitions for 
extraordinary relief. To the extent that this rule does not provide special 
procedures, proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed by 
the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(b)( 1) Scope. Except for instances governed by Rule 65C, this paragraph shall 
govern all petitions claiming that a person has been wrongfully restrained of 
personal liberty, and the court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(b)(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition 
with the clerk of the court in the district in which the petitioner is restrained or the 
respondent resides or in which the alleged restraint is occurring. 
(b)(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition shall contain a short, 
plain statement of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall 
identify the respondent and the place where the person is restrained. It shall state 
the cause or pretense of the restraint, if known by the petitioner. It shall state 
whether the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior 
proceeding and. if so, the reasons for the denial of relief in the prior proceeding. 
The petitioner shall attach to the petition any legal process available to the 
petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also attach to the petition a 
copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of the restraint. 
(b)(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or 
citations or discuss authorities m the petition, but these may be set out in a 
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(b)(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, if it is apparent to 
the court that the legality of the restraint has already been adjudicated in a prior 
proceeding, or if for any other reason any claim in the petition shall appear 
frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, 
stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the reasons for this conclusion. 
The order need not state findings of fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be 
sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the 
entry of the order of dismissal. 
(b)(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as being frivolous on 
its face, the court shall direct the clerk of the court to serve a copy of the petition 
and a copy of any memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, 
the court may issue an order directing the respondent to answer or otherwise 
respond to the petition, specifying a time within which the respondent must 
comply. If the circumstances require, the court may also issue an order directing 
the respondent to appear before the court for a hearing on the legality of the 
restraint. An answer to a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has 
restrained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the person so 
restrained has been transferred to any other person, and if so, the identity of the 
transferee, the date of the transfer, and the reason or authority for the transfer. 
Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to proliibit the court from mling upon 
the petition based upon a dispositive motion. 
(b)(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained will 
be removed from the court's jurisdiction or will suffer irreparable injury before 
compliance with the hearing order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warrant 
directing the sheriff to bring the respondent before the court to be dealt with 
according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the court may place the 
person alleged to have been restrained m the custody of such other persons as may 
be appropriate. 
(b)(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the respondent cannot be found, 
or if it appears that a person other than the respondent has custody of the person 
alleged to be restrained, the hearing order and any other process issued by the 
court may be served on the person having custody in the manner and with the 
same effect as if that person had been named as respondent in the action. 
(b)(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having custody of the person 
alleged to be restrained avoids service of the hearing order or attempts wrongfully 
to remove the person from the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately 
arrest the responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwith bring the person arrested 
before the court to be dealt with according to law. 
(b)( 10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the court orders a hearing, 
the court shall hear the matter in a summary fashion and shall render judgment 
accordingly. The respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the 
person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reasons for failing to do so. The 
court may nevertheless direct the respondent to bring before it the person alleged 
to be restrained. If the petitioner waives the right to be present at the hearing, the 
court shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall not be 
disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in the order or the petition, 
if enough is stated to impart the meaning and intent of the proceeding to the 
respondent. 
(c) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(c)(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney general may, and when 
directed to do so by the governor shall, petition the court for relief on the grounds 
enumerated in this paragraph. Any person who is not required to be represented by 
the attorney general and who is aggrieved or threatened by one of the acts 
enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph may petition the court under this 
paragraph if (A) the person claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by 
another or (B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this paragraph 
after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition filed by a person other than 
the attorney general under this paragraph shall be brought in the name of the 
petitioner, and the petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient 
sureties to pay any judgment for costs and damages that may be recovered against 
the petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties shall be in the form for bonds on 
appeal provided for in Rule 73. 
(c)(2) Grounds for relief Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where a person 
usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, whether 
cnil or military, a franchise, or an office in a corporation created by the authority 
of the state of Utah; (B) where a public officer does or permits any act that results 
in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons act as a corporation in the state of 
Utah without being legally incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated 
the laws of the state of Utah relatmg to the creation, alteration or renewal of 
corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited or misused its corporate 
rights, privileges or franchises. 
(c)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may require 
that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or may issue 
a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. 
The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms of Rule 
65A. 
(d) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with duty; actions by 
board of pardons and parole. 
(d)(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests are threatened by 
any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph may petition the court for relief. 
(d)(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: (A) where an inferior 
court, administrative agency, or officer exercising judicial functions has exceeded 
its jurisdiction or abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative 
agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act required by law as a 
duty of office, trust or station; (C) where an inferior court, administrative agency, 
corporation or person has refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or 
office to which the petitioner is entitled; or (D) where the Board of Pardons and 
Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform an act required by 
constitutional or statutory law. 
(d)(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, the court may 
require that notice be given to adverse parties before issuing a hearing order, or 
may issue a hearing order requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on 
the merits. The court may direct the inferior court, administrative agency, officer, 
corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver to the court a transcript 
or other record of the proceedings. The court may also grant temporary relief in 
accordance with the terms of Rule 65 A. 
(d)(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are judicial in nature, 
the court's review shall not extend further than to determine whether the 
respondent has regular!}' pursued its authority. 
Rule 29. Disability and disqualification of a judge or change of venue. 
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom 
a trial has begun is unable to continue with the trial, any other judge of that 
court or any judge assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council, 
upon certifying that the judge is familiar with the record of the trial, may, 
unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with and finish the trial, but if the 
assigned judge is satisfied that neither he nor another substitute judge can 
proceed with the trial, the judge may, in his discretion, grant a new trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom 
a defendant has been tried is unable to perform the duties required of the court 
after a verdict of guilty, any other judge of that court or any judge assigned by 
the presiding officer of the Judicial Council may perform those duties. 
(c)(1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to 
disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that the 
motion is filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating facts 
sufficient to show bias or prejudice, or conflict of interest. 
(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not later 
than 20 days after the last of the following: 
(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge; 
(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or 
(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion 
is based. 
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion shall 
be filed as soon as practicable. 
(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under Rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and subjects the party or attorney to the procedures 
and sanctions of Rule 11. No party may file more than one motion to disqualify 
in an action. 
(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without 
further hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the motion and 
affidavit to a reviewing judge. If the judge grants the motion, the order shall 
direct the presiding judge of the court or, if the court has no presiding judge, 
the presiding officer of the Judicial Council to assign another judge to the 
action or hearing. Assignment injustice court cases shall be in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-138. The presiding judge of the court, any judge of the 
district, any judge of a court of like jurisdiction, or the presiding officer of the 
Judicial Council may serve as the reviewing judge. 
(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely 
filed, filed in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall assign 
another judge to the action or hearing or request the presiding judge or the 
presiding officer of the Judicial Council to do so. Assignment injustice court 
cases shall be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-138. 
(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge may consider 
any part of the record of the action and may request of the judge who is the 
subject of the motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to questions posed 
by the reviewing judge. 
(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely manner. 
(d) (i) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a fair 
and impartial trial cannot be'had in the jurisdiction where the action is pending, 
either may, by motion, supported by an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have 
the trial of the case transferred to another jurisdiction. 
(ii) If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit are true 
and justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order for the removal of 
the case to the court of another jurisdiction free from the objection and all 
records pertaining to the case shall be transferred forthwith to the court in the 
other county. If the court is not satisfied that the representations so made justify 
transfer of the case, the court shall either enter an order denying the transfer or 
order a formal hearing in court to resolve the matter and receive further 
evidence with respect to the alleged prejudice. 
(e) When a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documents of record 
concerning the case shall be transferred without delay to the judge who shall 
hear the case. 
